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In large parts of the developing world agriculture remains a broad economic sector securing livelihoods
for large parts of the population. In the discourse on security implications of climate change, effects on
agricultural production and food insecurity are frequently claimed to be a plausible intermediate causal
connection. Earlier research has linked economic shocks to conﬂict outbreak but loss of income from
agriculture may also affect dynamics of ﬁghting in ongoing conﬂicts. We identify three complementary
processes through which loss of food production may escalate enduring conﬂicts: lowered opportunity
costs of rebelling, increased opportunities for recruitment, and accentuated and more widespread social
grievances. Using India as a test case, we investigate how year-on-year ﬂuctuations in food production
affect the severity of ongoing armed conﬂicts. The statistical analysis shows that harvest loss is robustly
associated with increased levels of political violence. To the extent that future climate change will
negatively affect local food production and economic activity, it appears that it also has the potential to
fuel further ﬁghting in areas that already are scenes of chronic conﬂict.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).“If one compares maps of precipitation with those of violence, a
disturbing pattern emerges: where drought advances, so do Mao-
ists” (Parenti, 2011, 135).
Introduction
The recent wave of uprisings across the Arab world and beyond
has accentuated claims that food insecurity constitutes an impor-
tant driver of contemporary political violence (Johnstone & Mazo,
2011; Sternberg, 2012). Food shortage and escalating food prices
may have multiple causes, including severe drought and resulting
crop failure in major food-producing areas. Partly for this reason
climate change is viewedwithmuch concern, and diminishing food
productivity in response to rising temperatures and increasingly
erratic rainfall patterns is frequently cited as a signiﬁcant threat to
societal stability and peace (e.g., Adger et al., 2014; Stern, 2006;
World Bank, 2010).
The academic debate on climate change and violent conﬂict is
far from settled. Some claim that climatic events are robustly linkedOslo, PRIO, PO Box 9229
fax: þ47 22 54 77 01.
Ltd. This is an open access articleto civil conﬂict risk whereas others fail to ﬁnd a systematic
connection. Overall, most attempts to synthesize the literature
conclude that scientiﬁc research to date provides mixed and
inconclusive ﬁndings (e.g., Bernauer, Boehmelt, & Koubi, 2012;
Meierding, 2013). Yet, this debate may be somewhat misplaced as
it (1) employs a restricted understanding of ‘climate’ that is limited
to extreme climatic events and yearly deviations from mean con-
ditions (climate variability), and (2) is largely limited to considering
climate as a possible trigger of political violence. While the global
number of armed conﬂicts has dropped considerably in recent
years (Themner & Wallensteen, 2013), many active insurgencies
have simmered for decades with no imminent prospect of resolu-
tion. Even if climate variability and extreme weather events are
weakly and inconsistently related to general conﬂict risk, shifting
environmental conditions and their immediate social impacts may
affect the dynamics of ongoing ﬁghting. Thus far, this issue has
received scant scientiﬁc attention. The sole focus on climate vari-
ability (although important, it is only one aspect of future climate
change) also devalues other effects of global warming (e.g., melting
glaciers, instability of the monsoon system) that have the potential
to have equally adverse effects on agricultural production and
economic performance in the future.
A third limitation with extant research is the near exclusive
focus on uncovering a direct, aggregate relationship between cli-
matic events and conﬂict without considering plausibleunder the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
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might materialize. This paper addresses these shortcomings. While
precipitation is a good predictor of agricultural production in areas
solely reliant on direct rain for farming, it is less good of an indi-
cator in countries that use irrigation and canal systems to regulate
water ﬂows and/or depend on groundwater extraction or annual
glacial runoff for water supply. In order to maximize generaliz-
ability and be more precise in testing the causal linkage, we move
beyond using short-term changes in rainfall levels as indicators of
economic performance. We focus directly on changes in agricul-
tural food production and how they inﬂuence the severity of
ongoing conﬂicts. Informed by the general civil war onset literature,
we argue that loss of income from agriculture may affect conﬂict
dynamics through three complementary processes: lowered op-
portunity costs of rebelling, increased opportunities for recruit-
ment, and accentuated and more widespread social grievances.
Absent proper compensation by the state (e.g., through relief aid,
food price subsidies, redistribution schemes, crop insurance), these
processes will motivate a larger pool of individuals to join and/or
support an active oppositionmovement to redress their grievances,
thus increasing the likelihood of violence escalation.
To test this general expectation, we conduct a quantitative
analysis of political violence across India since 1980. India is a
suitable microcosmos in this context as agriculture constitutes the
largest and most important economic sector and the country has
been the scene of a number of rural-based insurgencies over the
last few decades. The main ﬁnding shows that times of low agri-
cultural production are signiﬁcantly associated with higher casu-
alty ﬁgures in ongoing armed conﬂicts.
On conﬂict dynamics
What explains temporal dynamics of political violence is
analytically distinct from research questions addressed in the bulk
of the empirical civil war literature, namely issues relating to causes
for the initial outbreak of conﬂict.1 Even today, most quantitative
work seeks to reﬁne our understanding of how particular pre-war
structural and social conditions explain conﬂict onset (see Blattman
& Miguel, 2010 for a review). In contrast, after the surge of state
consolidation conﬂicts in the early 1990s there have been very few
new civil conﬂicts breaking out. Instead, inter-annual ﬂuctuations
in the frequency of armed conﬂicts today can to a large extent be
explained by cyclical patterns of initiation and failure of ceaseﬁres
as well as stochastic processes that cause conﬂicts to satisfy the
inclusion criteria of conventional conﬂict datasets only in some
years (see Themner & Wallensteen, 2013).
Most research to date that does move beyond onset analysis and
investigates the severity of intrastate conﬂict applies a strictly
comparative perspective, looking at aggregate characteristics to
understand why conﬂict(s) in country i generated more casualties
than conﬂict(s) in country j. For example, Lacina (2006) ﬁnds that
democracy is associated with signiﬁcantly fewer civil war deaths
than other political systems; Heger& Salehyan (2007) link civil war
severity inversely to the size of the ruling elite; whereas Lu & Thies
(2011) report that civil wars tend to be more deadly in countries
with larger economic inequalities. Shifting focus from host coun-
tries to characteristics of the actual conﬂicts, Lujala (2009) ﬁnds
that petroleum production and drug cultivation in the conﬂict zone
have opposite effects on battleﬁeld severity whereas Eck (2009)
shows that ethnically mobilized conﬂicts are much more likely to
escalate to the level of civil war than are other conﬂicts (see also
Costalli & Moro, 2012). These studies provide important insights
into aggregate patterns of intrastate conﬂict but they are unable to
inform us on drivers of temporal dynamics of violence within
conﬂicts.Partly due to coarse data, the question of what explains varia-
tions in casualties over time remains largely unaddressed. Common
explanations of conﬂict outbreak, and indeed of aggregate conﬂict
severity, refer to macroeconomic performance, political in-
stitutions, demographic and ethnic characteristics, and resource
dependence. With the exception of economic performance and
associated processes (e.g. unemployment rate; commodity prices),
these factors are either static or change only slowly and are as such
poor predictors of short-term variations in conﬂict intensity. In this
paper we propose that changes in food production can exert a
systematic and robust impact on conﬂict severity. Food insecurity
and economic shocks are frequently promoted as driving factors in
the climate-breads-conﬂict debate in Western media (Sneyd,
Legwegoh, & Fraser, 2013), but they are still largely ignored by the
civil conﬂict scholarship, which instead tends to focus on direct
relationships between climatic patterns and violence. In the
following sections we ﬁrst outline central arguments from the
environmental security literature linking climatic patterns to armed
conﬂict and then discuss how food insecurity and sudden loss of
agricultural income can be important drivers of conﬂict severity.
Environmental scarcity and conﬂict risk
Most quantitative work assessing correlations between envi-
ronmental conditions and armed conﬂict is theoretically informed
by environmental security thinking, which links scarcity of
renewable resources to violent uprisings, be it triggered by natural
disasters, climate variability and extremes, or environmentally
inducedmigration (Homer-Dixon,1999; Kahl, 2006). The forthright
argument typically describes how climatic anomalies such as
droughts, ﬂoods or changes in temperature affect state stability via
their impact on macroeconomic performance, agricultural output,
and livelihood security. Under certain (often tacitly assumed)
conditions, this process may increase both opportunities for
mobilization and personal incentives to use violence to redress
grievances. Examples of studies that pursue this logic include
Ciccone (2011), Hendrix & Glaser (2007), Koubi, Bernauer,
Kalbhenn, & Spilker (2012), and Miguel, Satyanath, & Sergenti
(2004) although the overall conclusions from this literature is
mixed (Bernauer et al., 2012; Gleditsch, 2012; Meierding, 2013;
Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, Link, & Schilling, 2012; Theisen,
Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013).
Apart from the mostly inconclusive empirical evidence for a
general climate-conﬂict association, a striking feature about the
literature is its near complete lack of attention devoted to possible
impacts of changing environmental conditions on the dynamics of
conﬂicts: whether and to what extent impacts of climate extremes
affect the severity of ﬁghting. Yet, some idiosyncratic evidence
suggests that climate change may “aggravate numerous existing
conﬂicts” (Gupta & Dutta, 2009, 40) even if climatic conditions by
themselves have little inﬂuence on the risk of new organized
violence, so this should be subject to more systematic scrutiny.
Environmental stress and conﬂict severity
The dynamics of severity e how conﬂicts escalate and contract
over time e are contingent on several factors. First, conﬂict severity
depends on the actors' motivations and opportunities for sustained
combat. As the sides recruit additional supporters, become better
armed and organized, receivemore support by the local population,
and become increasingly committed to the cause, military battles
are likely to become ﬁercer (Lacina, 2006; Weinstein, 2007).
Conversely, conﬂicts tend to fade as popular support for the rebels
wanes and the opportunity cost of protesting and ﬁghting the
government increases. Second, the course of conﬂict depends on
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conﬂict. In many cases, regimes facing armed opposition groups
seek to take advantage of shifting conditionse be it playing up local
inter-communal cleavages during times of election (e.g., Kahl,
2006) or providing selective compensation in response to disaster
events (see de Waal, 1991 for an account of how the Etiopian Derg
regime unsuccessfully attempted to exploit the 1984 drought to
quell the Tigrayan uprising).
Environmental stress can put people's lives and livelihoods at
risk, especially those dependent on agricultural output for food and
income security. Following water shortages, local farmers may
experience severe loss of harvests or may have to discard the
production of pulses and other crops or sell their livestock below
normal marked prices. This does not only put subsistence farmers
at risk but it also contributes to higher levels of unemployment
during the cultivation periods, especially among seasonal workers
and the landless poor. For example, both Paige (1975) and Scott
(1976) describe how vulnerable peasants are a central driving
force of rebellions and revolutions where economic hardship
threatens the survival of agrarian livelihoods. If the state fails to
respond in a satisfactory manner or public safety nets and insur-
ance schemes are absent and people lack personal credit to cope
with such shocks, individuals' incentives to join an ongoing in-
surgency against the government increase.
The general causal narrative outlined here rests on the
assumption that the severity of ﬁghting increases when the
opposing groups grow numerically larger. Larger rebel groups
imply more ﬁghters who can die in combat and are generally
perceived as a larger threat to the government, whichmay intensify
its military presence in the contested areas as a response. The logic
behind this reasoning is quite similar to conventional explanations
of civil war onset, but it differs in how it prescribes mobilization.
The initial forming of a political movement against the government
requires entrepreneurial leaders, a number of committed partici-
pants, as well as monetary and material resources. Conﬂict
outbreak thus is the outcome of a collective action by a coordinated
pool of followers, ‘ﬁrst movers’ or political entrepreneurs (Kalyvas
& Kocher, 2007, 182) with strong motivations and a shared
commitment to the cause at a certain point in time. In contrast, the
decision to join an established and active opposition movement is
an individual action, motivated by sudden changes in livelihood
security or expected short-term beneﬁts and pay-offs. Reasons for
an individual to join a rebellion at a later stage are more likely to be
found in the personal outlook on private or material beneﬁts and
security concerns than in the ideological conviction to ﬁght for a
common public good.
Our argument builds on three complementary theoretical ac-
counts prescribing a connection between declines in agricultural
output and severity of ﬁghting. The ﬁrst links agricultural decline
and associated economic loss with changes in individual material
gains of joining a rebellion relative to pursuing other economic
activity; the second views conﬂict sensitivity to economic vari-
ability through the latter's impact on the state's capacity to offer
credible compensation and the opposition elites' ability to recruit
new supporters; whereas the third argument focuses on emotional
reactions to adverse environmental conditions and inadequate
state response. The following paragraphs expand on how each of
these conceptually overlapping accounts may be associated with
ﬂuctuations in conﬂict severity.
(1) Individual Opportunity Cost
According to Collier&Hoefﬂer (2004; see also Ehrlich,1973), the
decision to take up arms against the government is based on in-
dividuals' rational calculations of expected beneﬁts of ﬁghting vis-a-vis normal economic activity. Although originally pitched within
the context of conﬂict outbreak e explaining the timing of mobi-
lization e the logic is in principle equally applicable to under-
standing recruitment and popular support during conﬂict. If
opportunities and prospects of legal income activities diminish,
participation in a rebellion becomes relatively more economically
advantageous and might be seen as a way out of the misery. While
potential costs and dangers of participating in a rebellionmaymake
joining unattractive, the promised long- and short-term beneﬁts e
material or around ethnic, religious or ideological promises e may
tip the balance in times of need (Weinstein, 2007).
In the absence of alternative modes of living, people living off
the land are forced to pursue unconventional coping strategies
when drought strikes or other environmental conditions severely
impact agricultural production and income. In economic terms, the
perspective of insecure revenue from agriculture can lower the
opportunity cost of joining an ongoing conﬂict (as well as criminal
behavior and looting more generally) such that violent action
emerges as a tempting alternative source of income to sustain one's
life and livelihood.
(2) Collective Opportunities for Mobilization
The second pathway takes an elite perspective by outlining how
loss of state and household income inhibits state compensation and
facilitates recruitment. Governments affected by a sudden eco-
nomic downturn may be weakened in their ability to deal with
insurgent activities, but more importantly, economic shocks make
it more difﬁcult to maintain expected levels of basic public services,
provide adequate compensation for experienced material loss, and
simultaneously secure sustained loyalty of central branches
(Miguel et al., 2004). If state support fails in times of environmental
hardship, grievances against the government become more prev-
alent and can intensify other discontent over employment, educa-
tion, political exclusion, and economic and religious structures. This
undermines political legitimacy and creates opportunities for po-
litical opponents and rebel leaders to raise people's awareness of
their misery. For the landless poor and smallholders, common de-
mands by insurgent groups such as self-determination, regional
autonomy, or redistribution of political and material privileges can
more easily be framed by entrepreneurial leaders as an attractive
coping strategy worth endorsing in times of personal need and
when one directly suffers from lack of support by the state.
The Naxalite movement in India is often used as an example in
this regard (Parenti, 2011). One-third of the Indian states have been
affected by Marxist violence since the country's independence in
1947. The Marxist rebels have primarily mobilized among farmers
and other people in the countryside. They gainedmuch popularity by
providing basic services to the deprived and among the tribal pop-
ulation by expressing their substantial grievances. While the Nax-
alites are especially popular among the rural poor, for standing up for
their demands and needs, a common claim is that they are “likely to
attract more adherents as the consequences of environmental stress
mount” (Paul, 2011, pp. 73e84). The Naxalites are also known for
what has been referred to as ‘famine raids’ (Garg, 2008, pp. 25e38).
During times of drought the rebels mobilize tribal groups and the
poor to loot rice mills or the houses of vendors, rich landlords and
government ofﬁcials for food, supplies, paddy and clothes (Garg,
2008). In Andhra Pradesh, one of the Naxalite hotspots, the gov-
ernment's drawback on subsidies in the early 1990s has forced many
farmers to take loans from the bank or local moneylenders
(Parthasarathy & Shameem, 1998). As a consequence of recurring
crop failure and the inability to repay debts, the number of suicides
in the region skyrocketed and support for the Naxals rose (Parenti,
2011).
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The third and complementary pathway centers on individual-
level grievances towards the state. In the same manner as coun-
tries differ with respect to their latent conﬂict risk, the propensity
for violent behavior is also likely to vary between social groups
within a society. For example, peripheral rural ethnic or religious
minorities are more often subject to active discrimination in po-
litical processes, they are more frequently repressed or denied their
entitlements, and violence can turn into a tool of resistance when
non-violent means of expression no longer works (Raleigh, 2010). If
governmental help is scarce or unequally distributed, social cleav-
ages are likely to become more pronounced. Minority groups that
are actively denied political participation because of their ethnicity,
religion, class or caste are also prone to being neglected or
discriminated by government-sponsored relief aid. This does not
only accentuate livelihood insecurity, it also ampliﬁes inequalities
between groups and shared grievances and frustrations towards
the government (as well as resentment toward the privileged).
Collective identities among marginalized groups facilitate a shared
perception of injustice, which is important when mobilizing for
rebellion (Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1975, 483e555). One example where
this logic appears to have played out forcefully is the growth of the
Sendero Luminoso [Shining Path] movement in Peru and the sub-
sequent escalation of violence:
Rural peasants in the jungle and the highlands, as well as the
indigenous people of southern Peru (the Quechua), were basi-
cally ignored as resources became scarce. Sendero Luminoso
generated interest and support by pointing to the government's
economic and political failures (Weinstein, 2007, 84).
The discussion of how livelihood activity, food security, and
income affect opportunities and motivation for joining a rebellion
can be summarized in the following general expectation:
H1. Conﬂict severity increases in times of low agricultural
production.
An alternative approach
It is not given that environmental stress always, or as a general
rule, leads to an intensiﬁcation of violence. The following section
outlines one reason for why sudden agricultural livelihood inse-
curity may reduce the severity of an ongoing conﬂict.
According to resource mobilization theory (e.g., Tilly, 1978),
sustaining a rebellion depends critically on the support by the local
population in terms of offering recruits, providing shelter, and
ensuring ample supplies of food and funds. In times of climatic
extremes and agricultural recession, household income from agri-
culture may diminish to the extent that the local populationmay be
forced to choose between supporting the rebellion and sustaining
their own livelihood. This would suggest that rebel organizations
would keep a lower proﬁle and generally avoid direct encounters
with superior state forces until environmental and economic con-
ditions are more conducive to renewed mobilization and ﬁghting.
Evidence of such a reverse dynamic is not hard to come by, and the
following observation from contemporary Africa is illustrative:
First, we ﬁnd some evidence that rainfall correlates with civil
war and insurgency, although conﬂict outbreak is more likely in
wetter years. This may be due to tactical considerations: violent
actors may be less likely to launch campaigns when there are
severe water shortages, making it difﬁcult to care for combat-
ants in the ﬁeld, and they will be more vulnerable when there is
less foliage to provide cover (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012, 45).H2. Conﬂict severity decreases in times of low agricultural pro-
duction.
Loss of income and increasing livelihood insecurity as a conse-
quence of environmental changes are certainly not the only factors
that might affect the level of ﬁghting in armed conﬂict. Political
elections are frequently associated with the outbreak of violence in
divided societies (Collier & Vicente, 2012; H€oglund, 2009) as they
often contribute to escalating intergroup animosity, provide oppor-
tunities for rallies and rebel recruitment, and more generally raise
the public's awareness of governance deﬁciencies and discrimina-
tion. Other plausible triggers of violence escalation include global
ﬁnancial crises and commodity price shocks, which can have severe
national and local consequences (Berkmen, Gelos, Rennhack, &
Walsh, 2012), as well as spillover effects from nearby social upris-
ings and armed conﬂicts (Gleditsch, 2007). In addition, the govern-
ment obviously plays a crucial role in affecting conﬂict dynamics
through how it decides to respond to imminent socioeconomic
crises (e.g., economic shocks, increasing food insecurity) and oppo-
sition mobilization (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009). The
security impacts of such events are likely to extend beyond sparking
the initial round of violence, although we consider these processes
complementary to, rather than conditioning, the separate effect of
local economic shocks related to failing food production.On India
To test these general propositions, we study temporal ﬂuctua-
tions in food production and political violence across India. India is
a near ideal case in this context, for two reasons. (1) The Indian
subcontinent is home to some of the oldest, most persistent, and
deadliest insurgencies in theworld. In fact, India is the countrywith
the highest number of ongoing intrastate conﬂicts over the last
decades (Themner &Wallensteen, 2013). As these conﬂicts involve
mostly rural populations living off the land, worsening conditions
under climate change have been promoted as a source of escalating
violence (Paul, 2011; see also Vadlamannati, 2011). (2) India is the
world's second largest food producer, agriculture constitutes the
largest economic sector in most Indian states even today, and while
there have been notable improvements in technology and irriga-
tion over the past decades agricultural yield still is sensitive to
precipitation patterns in main catchment areas and seasonal river
ﬂows. In India, 2/3 of the country's population depends on the
stability of the monsoonal rains between June and August for
subsistence agriculture (Paul, 2011). Due to the unequal spatial
distribution of the monsoonal rains across the Indian subcontinent,
direct rainfall is a poor indicator of agricultural production e in
contrast to other conﬂict-prone regions, such as Sub-Saharan Af-
rica, where food production is almost entirely dependent on local
rainfall. Projecting monsoonal behavior under climate change
scenarios includes considerable uncertainties and alternative sim-
ulations indicate both more intense rains (Kumar et al., 2006) and
decreases in absolute rainfall from the summer monsoon (Lal,
Cubash, Voss, & Waszkewitz, 1995). Additionally, rising tempera-
tures plus more frequent and longer droughts will affect agricul-
tural production via reduced river ﬂows and its effects on water
quantity in groundwater aquifers. While the direct temperature
effect could lead to an increase in production of certain crops there
is general agreement that the Indian agricultural productionwill be
negatively affected by water-stress due to climate change (Dinar,
Mendelsohn, & Songhi, 1998; Lal, Singh, Rathore, Srinivasan, &
Saseendran, 1998).
The availability of cheap electricity in India allows for wide-
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Fig. 1. Conﬂict severity in India, 1980e2011. ISPS e fatalities in state-based violence
from the India Sub-National Problem Set, 1980e2004; SATP e fatalities in violent
conﬂicts from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, 1993e2011; UCDP e battle deaths in
intrastate armed conﬂict from the Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program, 1989e2011.
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distribution and on glacial runoff from the Himalaya, which feeds
some of the major rivers in the north of the country. River ﬂows
across state borders and water distribution between federal units is
also a highly politicized process as states frequently quarrel and re-
negotiate allocated shares of water. The case of the waters in the
Cauvery River is a good example in that regard. The river runs from
the Indian State of Karnataka through Tamil Nadu where it enters
the Bay of Bengal and forms the Cauvery Delta, a major farming
area and ‘rice basket’ of Southern India. Decades of negotiations
have not lead to equitable sharing of the resource and the dispute
frequently runs high in anticipation of late or failed monsoonal
rains when water in the reservoirs runs low (Swain, 1998).
The main food commodities in terms of quantity are rice and
wheat. Since the year 2000, Indian agriculture has produced 90
million tons of rice and 76 million tons of wheat on average every
year (statistics derived from the Indian Ministry of Agriculture).
This represents an increase in output in excess of 50% since the
1980s although poor rural infrastructure (roads, irrigation and
ﬂood control, electricity, storage facilities), inefﬁcient smallholder
farming, and high rates of harvest spoilage have prevented a much
steeper increase in productivity. The potential for sustained growth
is substantial: Indian wheat production is only a third of France's
per area unit and rice productivity is less than half of the average
output in China. There are also huge differences between Indian
states both in terms of total production and crop yield per hectare.
Punjab is often labeled India's breadbasket with Haryana and Uttar
Pradesh being other major wheat producers. Rice production is
most extensive in the ﬂood plains and delta areas, as found in e.g.
West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh.
Adverse dips in agricultural productivity and soaring food prices
lead to deﬁcits in trade, income losses among the rural population,
and increase food insecurity among the poor (Lal & Chauhan,
2009). India's massive Public Distribution System (PDS), which is-
sues food belowmarket prices to the population below the poverty
line through a network of Fair Price Shops (FPS), is an important
instrument to secure basic food availability. However, food grains
supplied by the FPS are not enough to meet the consumption needs
of the poor, are often of inferior quality, and fair distribution is
challenged by corruption. While the program ensures availability of
basic commodities (rice, wheat, edible oils), it only makes up about
11% of food grains consumption among the rural poor and does not
compensate for reduced access to food due to income poverty (Dev
& Sharma, 2010; Swaminathan, 2000).
Data and analytical framework
To capture regional diversity in conﬂict patterns as well as
economic development and agriculture, we use a dataset of Indian
states covering the time period 1980e2011. The Indian state system
as we see it today came into effect in 1956 following the States
Reorganization Act. The major reform of Indian boundaries sepa-
rated between states along linguistic and ethnic lines. The Indian
states have substantial governmental autonomy while the union
territories are smaller areas governed by administrators, who have
been nominated by the Indian President. Since 1956 there have
been several minor changes in the state system, with larger states
splitting and some union territories achieving statehood. The panel
structure of our dataset includes all current 28 states and 7 union
territories of the Indian subcontinent and it takes temporal changes
in state borders into account.
The dependent variable in the main models is severity of state-
based political violence, measured in logged number of people
killed per state year. Three different conﬂict indicators from sepa-
rate data providers are analyzed in order to maximize the breadthand rigidity of the analysis. The ﬁrst dependent variable is con-
structed from the India Sub-National Problem Set (ISPS; Marshall,
Sardesi, & Marshall, 2005), which is based on news reporting in
Keesing's Record of World Events. ISPS collects a set of different pa-
rameterse timing, location, counts of participants, and casualtiese
on conﬂictive events between 1960 and 2004 and assigns them to
different levels and types of violence. By aggregating those cate-
gories that refer to violence against the state2 we constructed our
own count measure of casualties in violent events that can be
considered state-based conﬂicts, i.e. incompatibilities between the
state and non-state actors that concern issues inherently linked to
the state and/or national government.
The second conﬂict severity indicator is based on data from the
South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), which collects annual counts of
deadly incidents in states that are scenes of chronic conﬂict, with
signiﬁcant violence year on year. The database contains yearly es-
timates of violent activity in 18 states over differing time-periods,
though most of these states are covered only from 1993.3
The third indicator is the number of battle deaths in armed
intrastate conﬂicts from the Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program (UCDP)
Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (UCDP, 2013). UCDP codes the re-
ported number of people killed in combat for all conﬂict-years with
more than 25 battle-related fatalities, 1989e2011. Since all Indian
armed conﬂicts, except the Naxalite rebellion, are territorial or
separatist conﬂicts, we simply assigned battle deaths4 to the state
that is listed as the main issue of incompatibility on a case by case
basis. To not lose observations for the Maoist rebellion, which lacks
locational information in the UCDP data, we replaced UCDP's esti-
mates with fatality counts from SATP for the states that have seen
continuous left-wing violence.
Fig. 1 shows the temporal coverage and trend in conﬂict severity
for the three conﬂict indicators. Even though the trend lines
correspond fairly well in overlapping years, it is clear that the
different datasets capture somewhat different forms of political
violence. The SATP casualty estimates are consistently higher than
those of the other two variables, which suggest that this dataset
relies on a broader set of sources and, possibly, applies less
restrictive criteria for deﬁning organized and politically relevant
violence.
Just as political violence varies in intensity over time it also
shows considerable spatial variation (Fig. 2). The states that have
the highest rates of state-based violence are Jammu and Kashmir in
Fig. 2. Violence rates across India. The ﬁgure illustrates the severity of political violence for contemporary Indian states, expressed as reported fatalities as a share of the state's
population size and categorized in quintiles. Panel (a) shows fatalities per capita in state-based violence from the India Sub-National Problem Set, 1980e2004; panel (b) shows
fatalities per capita in violent conﬂicts from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, 1993e2011; panel (c) shows battle deaths per capita in intrastate conﬂict from the Uppsala Conﬂict Data
Program, 1989e2011. Darker shades indicate higher rates of violence.
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northeastern India, where several active secessionist insurgencies
are located. In addition, Maoist violent activity, which is best
captured by the SATP data, is clearly detectable along the “Red
Corridor” in Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, and adjacent strong-
holds of the Naxalite movement in central India (Hoelscher,
Miklian, & Vadlamannati, 2012).
The main independent variable for this study is an indicator of
food production growth. In a ﬁrst step, we use annual data on
wheat and rice production obtained from the Indian Ministry of
Agriculture to construct state-speciﬁc measures of wheat and rice
production, 1980e2011. Based on these indicators, we identiﬁed
the main agricultural commodity for each Indian state, and then
calculated a simple interannual growth measure, operationalized
as Food growth¼ (Agricultural production t  Agricultural production
t1)/Agricultural production t1. States without signiﬁcant rice or
wheat production are excluded since these observations would be
unable to shed light on how variations in food production affect
conﬂict dynamics.5
Interannual growth is the preferred measure since we are
interested in tracing short-term changes in opportunities and
motivation for individuals to join an ongoing rebellion. Accordingly,
a short-term negative growth should increase the latent pool of
rebel recruits under the ceteris paribus assumption regardless of
whether it constitutes a return to normal yields from an ample
previous harvest or worsening of already adverse conditions during
the previous year. This reasoning is decidedly distinct from the logic
informing relevant research on civil conﬂict onset, in which abso-
lute deprivation, or negative deviations from long-term mean
trends, is considered the most conﬂict-prone context (Ciccone,
2011; Koubi et al., 2012). In sensitivity tests we replace food
growth with economic growth as a possible driver of conﬂict
severity.
All reported models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression with a limited number of controls; mean conﬂict
severity (logged casualties) among contiguous Indian states (te1)
to handle possible spatial dependencies in the data (Beck,
Gleditsch, & Beardsley, 2006); a time-lagged dependent variable
(logged casualties te1) to control for serial dependence (Beck, Katz,
& Tucker, 1998); state ﬁxed effects to control for unit heterogeneity,
and a common time trend. The ﬁxed effects approach ensures that
all results reﬂect strictly temporal covariance, implying that the
particulars of each state e such as suitability and mode of agri-
culture, average productivity growth rates, and other time-
invariant traits e are accounted for by design. Since the conﬂictindicators have different temporal coverage and we apply different
intensity thresholds for inclusion, the models presented below
cover different subsets of the full sample, 1980e2011. Note that we
ﬁnd the linear OLS model preferable to a two-stage instrumental
variable approach, which has been used in some earlier research
(Koubi et al., 2012; Miguel et al., 2004). For reasons outlined above,
rainfall is a poor instrument for food production among contem-
porary Indian states, and our quest concerns estimating security
impacts of agricultural performance, regardless of what role the
weather might play. See the section on robustness tests for dis-
cussion of alternative speciﬁcations.
Empirical results
The extent to which future global warming will affect precipi-
tation patterns and annual run-off from glaciers and affect
government-induced water sharing policies is interesting as it can
have signiﬁcant consequences for food production and income
from agriculture. Even if technological innovation and develop-
ment make the agricultural sector less vulnerable to direct climatic
stress, it is the complexity of social and environmental processes
that lead to actual or perceived water scarcity and food insecurity.
Understanding how crop failure and food insecurity can have an
independent effect on political violence is thus important in its own
right, regardless of how future climate change may affect the
conditions for sustained agricultural growth.
Table 1 presents the main results from the analysis of the rela-
tionship between conﬂict severity and food production growth.
Model 1 is run on violence data from ISPS and covers all states with
at least ﬁve years of reported fatalities; Model 2 uses casualty es-
timates from SATP and includes all state years with reported con-
ﬂict in the sample period; and UCDP's estimates of battle-related
deaths in intrastate armed conﬂicts are used in Model 3. Varying
numbers of observations across model speciﬁcations are caused by
differences in temporal and spatial coverage of the dependent
variables and the sample inclusion criterion.
In line with Hypothesis 1, all three models indicate that food
production growth lowers the intensity of organized violence. Only
the lagged measure obtains a signiﬁcant estimate at 5% level of
uncertainty, however, which suggests that it takes some time from
changing economic conditions in the countryside to translate into
altered conﬂict behavior.
The temporal and spatial controls for autocorrelation and con-
ﬂict diffusion reveal some interesting, and at ﬁrst sight seemingly
counterintuitive, patterns. Earlier civil war research has found a
Table 1








Food growth t 0.425 (0.271) 0.109 (0.131) 0.314 (0.350)
Food growth t1 0.514** (0.255) 0.473** (0.231) 1.379** (0.414)
Time 0.004 (0.012) 0.042** (0.010) 0.031* (0.018)
Neighbor severity t1 0.203** (0.059) 0.041 (0.029) 0.359** (0.142)
Conﬂict severity t1 0.156** (0.059) 0.507** (0.065) 0.692** (0.063)
Constant 3.775** (0.830) 5.271** (0.769) 1.645 (1.029)
Observations 414 191 232
R-squared 0.324 0.889 0.736
Note: OLS with state ﬁxed effects; robust standard errors in parentheses; **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
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neighboring country signiﬁcantly increases the baseline risk of
conﬂict due to negative economic externalities (Murdoch &
Sandler, 2004), refugee ﬂows (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), and
cultural ties between nationalist groups (Buhaug & Gleditsch,
2008). Our data suggest that, within India, the neighborhood ef-
fect of conﬂict is opposite. Evidently, states with severe violence
nearby tend to have lower levels of violence than expected by
chance, other factors held constant. We believe this discrepancy
can be ascribed to inherent differences between onset and severity
analysis; our models only include observations already suffering
from armed conﬂict, in which the proposed trigger effect of nearby
violence is largely foregone. Also, an inspection of themaps in Fig. 2
reveals several local hotspots of violence, surrounded by relatively
peaceful states. For the estimated samples, the conﬂict indicators
and their neighbor severity counterparts correlate in the range
from r ¼ 0.15 (ISPS) and r ¼ 0.37 (SATP). The conﬂict history
variable, however, replicates the very powerful temporal effect
documented in cross-national civil war literature. Lastly, we ﬁnd
little consistency in the time trend across conﬂict types: Whereas
the ISPS state-based fatalities show little indication of a linear (or
parabolic) trend, the SATP and UCDP estimates suggest an under-
lying downward and upward trend over time, respectively.
The models differ considerably in the extent to which they
explain the observed variation in conﬂict severity. Models 2 and 3
ﬁt very well to the empirical data whereas Model 1 leaves much
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Fig. 3. Predicted conﬂict severity by food production. The vertical axis shows estimated log c
Dotted lines denote 95% conﬁdence interval round the mean effect. ISPS e fatalities in stat
conﬂicts from the South Asia Terrorism Portal; UCDP e battle deaths in intrastate conﬂictthe different samples covered, and, to a lesser extent, because of
different inclusion criterion being applied; Model 2, which obtains
the highest estimated R2, only includes state years with reported
casualties whereas the other models also include non-violent years
in all states that see the given form of conﬂict in at least ﬁve years in
total. In robustness tests documented in the Supplementary
Material, we evaluate the sensitivity of these results to changing
the sample inclusion criterion.
Fig. 3 provides a visual interpretation of the regression results,
illustrating how the estimated severity of political violence drops
with increased levels of food production (last year) across all three
conﬂict datasets. The plots were created by means of the Clarify
expansion package to Stata (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2001),
holding spatial and temporal conﬂict lags at their minimum values.
The absolute prediction values are less interesting in this context
than the overall trend, or shape of the effect, although the differ-
ence in expected severity levels between a good and a bad harvest
is notable. For example, violence fromMaoist insurgent activities in
Chhattisgarh is predicted to increase from 347 to 457 deaths if food
production growth drops one-standard deviation below mean
levels, other factors held constant. For other states and other con-
ﬂict types the effect is less dramatic.
The negative estimates for food production growth on the
severity of armed conﬂict correspond well with theoretical ex-
pectations and they alsomirror earlier ﬁndings on the link between
economic shocks and communal violence in India (Bohlken &
Sergenti, 2010). Moreover, the consistency of the pattern across
deﬁnitions of state-based conﬂict indicates that it is very unlikely to
be found at random, although we need to consider an alternative
explanation to the one proposed above before concluding on the
direction of causality. Economic activity and violent conﬂict are
prone to endogeneity, where past violence affects current eco-
nomic behavior (Gates, Hegre, Nygård, & Strand, 2012) e possibly
to amuch greater extent than past economic growth rate affects the
severity of current conﬂict. Accordingly, we estimated the conﬂict
models in Table 1 with lead instead of lag food production. If violent
conﬂict in India indeed has a powerful impact on agricultural
production, we should ﬁnd that next year's level of food production
correlates negatively and signiﬁcantly with current-year level of
violence. In models shown in the Supplementary Material, we ﬁnd
that this is not the case; the effect of food production growth (tþ 1)
on conﬂict severity (t) is statistically indistinguishable from zero for
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onﬂict casualties while the horizontal axis represents food production growth last year.
e-based violence from the India Sub-National Problem Set; SATP e fatalities in violent
from the Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program.
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as the dependent variable. We also considered an instrumental
variable approach as an added test for endogeneity, using rainfall
growth as an exogenous instrument for food production growth.
However, averaged annual rainfall statistics exert a weak associa-
tionwith state-level food production in India, explaining only about
7% of the variation in food production in our data e around half of
the reported effect of rainfall on economic growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa, which is still considered “somewhat weak” (Miguel et al.,
2004, 735). Hence, we are reluctant to interpret the weak and
inconsistent results from this test as evidence that our ﬁnding re-
ﬂects a reverse causal relationship. More plausibly, the estimated
effect of food production growth on conﬂict severity is largely
insensitive to averaged statistics on year-on-year ﬂuctuations in
local rainfall.
Since agriculture is the largest economic sector in most Indian
states, we also inspected the direct effect of growth in state-level
GDP on the severity of conﬂict. This additional test found a
similar pattern for two of the three indicators of conﬂict although
overall the results are somewhat less consistent than what we re-
ported above. This was not entirely surprising since the agricultural
sector makes up a modest part of the GDP even if it employs the
largest share of the total workforce, and hence economic volatilities
are affected by other factors besides variation in crop yields.
Next, we considered the sensitivity of the reported ﬁndings to
changes in the sample size. In Models 1 and 3, we include all state
years with valid data that saw at least ﬁve years of fatal unrest
during the analysis period. This is a generous inclusion criterion as
it permits considering a substantial number of state years that did
not experience fatal unrest. Hence, we also estimated these models
with a sample reduced to states with at least ten years of fatal
conﬂict. This led to a slightly larger estimated effect of food pro-
duction growth. Likewise, we expanded the sample to include
states without signiﬁcant agricultural production; the results do
not change.
Other sensitivity tests included possible interaction effects.
Although the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation takes care of underlying,
time-invariant differences in conﬂict propensity, it might also be
that the social impact of a given agricultural shock depends on
certain state-speciﬁc conditions. Several possible conditions were
considered, such as state rural poverty and agricultural production
per capita, without returning results that overturn the main
conclusion presented here. Earlier research has tested for similar
interactions with political marginalization (e.g., Theisen,
Holtermann, & Buhaug, 2011/12; Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014),
although the coarse nature of available group-level exclusion data
combined with the democratic system of India imply that there
would be very little subnational variation in such indicators in our
context. All of these tests are documented in the Supplementary
Material. Taken together, the results show that a reduction in
crop yields has a signiﬁcant and adverse impact on conﬂict
dynamics.
Discussion
Overall, the analysis demonstrated that ﬂuctuations in food
production can have direct effects on the dynamics of organized
political violence. Based on three distinct and complementary
conﬂict datasets, we found that a loss of harvest is signiﬁcantly
associated with an increase in severity of ﬁghting during the sub-
sequent year. The effect is signiﬁcant also in substantive terms, if
less inﬂuential overall than conﬂict history or time-invariant and
conﬂict-speciﬁc drivers of baseline violence intensity. With refer-
ence to the two proposed hypotheses, it is clear that the empirical
material offers much more support for the conventionalenvironmental scarcity-inspired expectation than the feasibility
argument that predicts actors to invest in protest and rebellion
during surplus times (see also Urdal, 2008).
So, is a poor harvest a good indication of escalating violence in
India? Based on the results presented above, the answer is a
qualiﬁed yes. Across all models, the parameter estimates for food
production are negative, but the strength of the association de-
pends on the indicator under consideration as well as the applied
time lag, and themagnitude of the estimated effect also depends on
underlying risk factors. To the extent that social impacts of future
climate change or other socioeconomic developments will nega-
tively affect Indian agricultural production, increased livelihood
insecurity and escalation of violent conﬂicts constitute possible
consequences. However, while a historical trend is seen between
rural livelihood security and the severity of ﬁghting, projections
into the future should be conducted with care. India's impressive
National Action Plan on Climate Change speciﬁcally aims at making
the country's agricultural sector more resilient towards worsening
environmental conditions. By introducing thermally resistant crops
and alternative production patterns, improving water resource
management by optimizing irrigation, investing in water storage
and distribution systems, and boosting job creation for some of
India's poorest communities, the government aims to reduce
poverty and lower rural vulnerability towards climate change (FAO,
2011). The potential for efﬁciency improvements in the Indian
agricultural sector is considerable, and very likely several times
greater in magnitude than possible negative productivity impacts
of climate change in the short to medium term (Godfray et al.,
2010). Additionally, India is rapidly transforming from a rural to
an urban society with vulnerabilities to climate change potentially
shifting from the countryside to the (informal) urban and peri-
urban settlements. Future efforts to unravel societal implications
of climate change should emphasize urban insecurities that are
created through environmentally induced migration, pressure on
public resources (jobs, housings, health care, etc.), rising food pri-
ces, and ampliﬁed social inequalities.
To what extent can the reported link between failing food pro-
duction and escalating violence be considered representative for a
larger number of cases across the globe? This remains to be
determined, although the fact that many agriculturally dependent
societies, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, are also hosts of durable
violent conﬂicts makes such a general pattern plausible. Despite
decades of consistent progress in curtailing hunger, the number of
food insecure is yet again on the rise, so the potential for conﬂict
escalation and political instability may also be increasing. More-
over, India could to some extent be considered a tough case since
the state has initiated large-scale food subsidies and distribution
systems to alleviate some of the social pressure imposed by
widespread food insecurity and general poverty. Such ‘safety nets’
are critical measures to mitigate the negative effect of short-term
threats to food availability, potentially helping to prevent escala-
tion of violent conﬂict and contribute to long-term development.
However, especially in areas where such instruments are under-
developed, mismanaged or weak, food insecurity becomes both a
contributing factor to conﬂict but also a consequence of widespread
violence. Since the Indian population in principle should be
somewhat less vulnerable to socioeconomic shocks due to
governmental food subsidies and the Public Distribution System, an
even stronger link between food insecurity and severity of ﬁghting
might be expected in states with more fragile market structures
and weak political institutions. However, such speculations about
security implications of food shortages in the future should be
conducted carefully, as advances in international food assistance,
aid, and provision of basic services in conﬂict zones may contribute
to remedying adverse effects of failed agricultural production.
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Endnotes
1 We use the terms political violence, violent conﬂict, armed conﬂict, and civil war
interchangeably throughout the article unless speciﬁed otherwise. By these terms,
we imply violent ﬁghting between organized groups (usually involving the state)
that leads to the loss of human lives. In the statistical analysis below, the models
differ with respect to the minimum severity threshold for inclusion.
2 The conﬂict type (CTYPE) categories from the India Sub-National Problem Set that
we aggregate are the following: 1 e General Warfare; 2 e Ethnic/Identity Warfare;
3 e Political/Economic Warfare; 11 e Pro-Government Terrorism Campaign
(Repression); 12 e Anti-Government Terrorism Campaign; 21 e Armed Battle/
Clash; 22 e Armed Attack; 23 e Organized Violent Riot/Demonstration; 24 e
Spontaneous Violent Riot/Demonstration).
3 In all, 18 states are included in SATP, though only ten states have data for ten years
or more and most are recorded only from 1993 and onwards. The database is un-
clear on whether missing observations (and a small number of coded zeros) imply
no relevant activity or truly missing information so we decided to only include state
years with positive values on the terrorism count.
4 The UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset speciﬁes low, high, and best estimates for
each conﬂict year. We use the best estimate in our analysis.
5 Our theoretical concern is how ﬂuctuations in agricultural performance might
affect ﬂuctuations in conﬂict severity. A state with no signiﬁcant food production
thus is unable to shed light on the variation in the dependent variable. However, as
a robustness test, we relaxed this inclusion criterion and replaced missing pro-
duction growth statistics with zero. The main ﬁnding upholds.References
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